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Action Orientations of 
University Students 
MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL 
RONALD J. Buscii 
COMPARED TO MASS PUBLICS IN OTHER NATIONS, a relatively large 
number of Americans believe that they are politically competent- 
that they are able to influence political affairs. And yet, over the 
past several years we have witnessed the estrangement of substan- 
tial portions of the American citizenry from the political system- 
an estrangement accompanied by an increase in popular distrust of 
government.' 
As concepts, political competence and political trust have occu- 
* The authors are indebted to Prof. Sheldon Gawiser for his collaboration 
in the design and sampling stages of this research. We are also grateful to the 
administrations of Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland State Univer- 
sity, and John Carroll University, and especially to Thomas A. Campbell, Jack 
A. Soules, and Eugene S. Uyeki. We benefited from the comments and sug- 
gestions of Thomas A. Flinn, C. Richard Hofstetter, Brian D. Silver, and 
Robert Weissberg. 
1 Arthur H. Miller, Thad A. Brown and Alden F. Raine, "Social Conflict and 
Political Estrangement, 1958-1972" (paper presented at the annual meeting of 
the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., May 3-5, 1973); and 
Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Government Information Policy," Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 35 (Winter/Spring 1971-72), 636-651. 
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pied significant positions in our models of mass political behavior 
and in our theories about the political system, and more recently 
the combination of these variables has attracted the attention of a 
number of scholars. Much of the research has shown that Ameri- 
cans who exhibit a sense of political competence tend also to trust 
the national government, a situation that contributes to the stability 
of the political system.2 When highly competent people lose con- 
fidence in their government, there is good reason to expect an in- 
crease in social disruption and political violence. Among some 
subcultures-for example, black residents of ghetto communities- 
certain evidence indicates that politically competent low trusters 
were more likely to riot than others.3 In such subcultural groups, 
however, it is unlikely that this combination of competence and 
distrust occurs very frequently. Although the level of political 
trust among blacks may be low, the belief that one can influence 
political outcomes is less widespread than in the general public.4 
On the other hand, within some groups we are likely to find a rather 
large proportion of highly competent people who distrust the gov- 
ernment. An obvious example is the university community. The 
social characteristics of college students are conducive to feelings 
of personal and political competence, but at the same time many 
students have demonstrated a lack of faith and confidence in gov- 
ernment. To explore the consequences of this mixture of high 
competence and low trust, the present study examines these vari- 
ables as they are related to the action orientations of university 
students. 
2 Richard L. Cole, "On the Causes and Consequences of Political Trust: A 
Causal Analysis" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Po- 
litical Science Association, Chicago, Ill., April 28, 1972). See also Cole's 
"Toward a Model of Political Trust: A Causal Analysis," American Journal 
of Political Science, 17 (November 1973), 809-817. 
3 William Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," in Social Psychol- 
ogy and Political Behavior: Problems and Prospects, ed. Gilbert Abcarian and 
John W. Soule (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1971), 
40-55. 
4 Paul R. Abramson, "Political Efficacy and Political Trust Among Black 
Schoolchildren: Two Explanations," Journal of Politics, 34 (November 1972), 
1,243-1,275. Also see Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes 
and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 
1966), 275-280. 
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POLITICAL TRUST AND POLITICAL COMPETENCE 
Preliminary to our empirical analysis, we here introduce the two 
concepts that serve as a foundation for that which follows. 
Trust in Government 
Although one finds serious discrepancies if not contradictions in 
the literature on the origins of people's trust in government, the 
process whereby it is diffused, and its consequences for political 
behavior, general agreement on the importance of trust for the 
political system seems to exist. It promotes legitimacy; it is con- 
ducive to system stability; and it provides discretionary power for 
political elites.5 As many have observed, all regimes strive to es- 
5Most empirical research devoted to the concept of political trust can be 
divided into studies that examine the correlates of trust as a dependent vari- 
able and those that characterize trust in government as an independent variable 
influencing citizen attitudes and behavior. Depending on the characteristics of 
the setting and population under study, political trust has been found to covary 
with social trust, age, education, income, sense of political efficacy, political 
alienation, a general feeling of deprivation, citizen expectations about treatment 
from government officials, level of alertness to external danger, strength of 
drive to self-assertion, and race. Does it make any difference, however, if the 
citizenry or significant portions thereof, is trusting of the institutions and 
actors of the political system? Those interested in this question have found 
political trust to be related to voting turnout, the direction of the vote, voting 
for extremist candidates, dissatisfaction with policy outcomes, a willingness to 
violence or coercive and demonstrative behavior, and an attachment to salient 
political structures in the society. Among the more relevant publications, see 
Joel D. Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behavior," American Political Sci- 
ence Review, 63 (March 1969), 86-99; Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, "Politi- 
cal Trust and Racial Ideology," American Political Science Review, 64 (De- 
cember 1970), 1,199-1,219; Abramson, "Political Efficacy," 1,243-1,275; Robert 
E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley Pearl, "Political Cynicism: 
Measurement and Meaning," Journal of Politics, 23 (August 1961), 477-506; 
George I. Balch, "Political Trust and Styles of Political Involvement Among 
American College Students" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., April 29-May 1, 1971); 
Cole, "Causes and Consequences"; John Fraser, "The Mistrustful-Efficacious 
Hypothesis and Political Participation," Journal of Politics, 32 (May 1970), 
444-449; Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 40-45; Martin Kraus, 
Kevin Houlihan, Mark I. Oberlander, and Lawrence Carson, "Some Motiva- 
tional Correlates of Attitudes Toward Political Participation," Midwest Journal 
of Political Science, 14 (August 1970), 383-391; Edgar Litt, "Political Cyni- 
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tablish a basis of authority independent of coercive force, and to 
instill in the populace an abiding sense of trust and allegiance. 
Since a marked decline in trust may encourage instability or "im- 
mobilism," mechanisms exist in all political systems to engender 
trust in political actors, processes, and institutions. 
To the extent that political trust is associated with interpersonal 
(social) trust, there are additional ramifications for political life. 
Group political behavior presupposes a willingness to co-operate. 
Broadly based coalitions in the political system, dependent as they 
are on agreement that cuts across extant cleavages and opinions, 
often require of their adherents a belief in the integrity, ability, or 
correctness of one set of political objects as opposed to others. 
When intracoalitional trust deteriorates, existing intercoalitional 
arrangements may become fragile if not altered. Though inter- 
personal trust may be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for social co-operation-indeed, under certain conditions distrust 
may stimulate co-operation among those with similar feelings-it 
seems clear that social trust facilitates collective action and prob- 
ably also increases the likelihood of that action becoming routine 
over time.6 
Political Competence 
While some minimal level of citizen trust in government is essen- 
cism and Political Futility," Journal of Politics, 25 (May 1963), 312-323; 
Edward L. McDill and Jean Clare Ridley, "Status, Anomia, Political Aliena- 
tion and Political Participation," American Journal of Sociology, 68 (Septem- 
ber 1968), 205-213; Edward N. Muller, "The Representation of Citizens by 
Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support," American Political 
Science Review, 64 (December 1970), 1,149-1,166; Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr., 
and George Taylor, "Pre-Adult Attitudes Toward Legal Compliance: Notes 
Toward A Theory," in Political Attitudes and Public Opinion, ed. Dan Nimmo 
and Charles Bonjean (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1972), 215-227; 
Donald E. Stokes, "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical As- 
sessment," in Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political 
and Military, ed. Harland Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962), 61-73; Meredith W. Watts, "Efficacy, Trust, and Orien- 
tation Toward Socio-Political Authority: Students' Support for the University," 
American Journal of Political Science, 17 (May 1973), 282-301. 
6 For a more detailed statement of how hostility and distrust functions for 
group life, see Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The 
Free Press, 1956), pts. 2 and 5. 
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tial to long-term regime success, the significance of political com- 
petence varies with the value placed on the role of "citizen" in 
public affairs. In a society committed to popular rule, a widely 
shared sense of political competence encourages an aware and 
active citizenry and thus allows some influence over the general 
direction of public policy. A self-confident and politically involved 
populace also serves to protect the public interest, providing a 
check against governmental power.7 
A strong sense of political competence also appears to have per- 
sonal dividends. A persistent tradition in American political 
thought posits an active and informed citizen role as a vehicle 
through which an individual achieves self-fulfillment. The sub- 
jectively competent and politically active citizen presumably de- 
rives certain psychological gratifications from having involved him- 
self in political life: he acquires a heightened sense of importance 
and well-being especially if successful in his endeavors.8 It is 
obvious that not all citizens, nor even all competent citizens, engage 
in political action, and it may well be that the person who believes 
that he is able to influence government, but never tries, also derives 
certain benefits.9 While confidence in one's political acumen and 
abilities may provide a set of highly positive and functional beliefs, 
7 In political communities that are not committed to free and meaningful 
citizen participation, a politically competent citizenry may be eufunctional, if 
not dysfunctional, to the political order. See, however, Frederick C. Barghoorn, 
Politics in the USSR (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966); and James H. 
Oliver, "Citizen Demands and the Soviet Political System," American Political 
Science Review, 63 (June 1969), 465-475, for alternative interpretations. 
8 This is but one aspect of the humanistic and naturalistic philosophy raised 
most forcefully by John Dewey and continued in the action-oriented psychology 
dedicated to the idea that a man is what he does and becomes by doing. Its 
political component has a heritage reaching back to the ideals of an active 
citizenry characterized in the Greek city state. See H. Mark Roelofs, The 
Tension of Citizenship: Private Man and Public Duty (New York: Rinehart 
& Co., Inc., 1958). 
9 If they are unsuccessful in political life, there are those who would mini- 
mize the significance of the outcome in order to avoid' the feeling of failure. 
Apparently there exists a cost-benefit ratio by which the citizen attains sufficient 
value satisfactions from having participated, albeit in a losing effort, to offset 
the attendant cost of having engaged in the first place. For example, in- 
vestigators in the Elmira study found that losing partisans tended to play down 
the impact of the election, thus reducing personal costs in their unsuccessful 
venture. Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, 
Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). 
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inactivity avoids a variety of "costs," including the possibility of 
frustration due to failure.10 
The Competence-Trust Relationship 
The political trust and political competence literature is exten- 
sive, yet social scientists have only begun to examine the interrela- 
tionship between these two variables. With Gamson's illuminating 
theoretical discussion of the subject as a basis, one can postulate a 
series of behavioral consequences that result from the fusion of 
trust and political competence.1" The first combination, a low 
level of political trust and a limited sense of political competence, 
characterizes the apathetic, indifferent spectator who is minimally 
involved in political life. Those who possess this same low level of 
10 Scores of studies suggest a relationship between one's sense of effective- 
ness in political life and a wide array of politically-relevant attitudinal and 
behavioral variables. These are far too numerous and too well known to re- 
quire review here. These studies have been accompanied by equally ambitious 
efforts to develop valid and reliable measures of political efficacy. Much of 
our scholarship has been based on either the Survey Research Center's four- 
item efficacy scale, whose referents are the citizen's belief in the receptivity of 
government to citizen influence and his sense of political self-confidence, or the 
somewhat broader view of this motivating force as conceived by Almond and 
Verba. Their study included in its five-item scale of political competence not 
only the dimension of governmental responsiveness but also the informational 
base that is considered to be prerequisite to effective political action and the 
confidence in oneself that is required as a stimulus to action. Hence, the be- 
lief that government is responsive to personal influence further implies (1) 
that the individual possesses the amount and kind of knowledge that is adequate 
for directing his political claims and grievances to the proper authorities; and 
(2) that he feels sufficiently confident in his ability to succeed when cir- 
cumstances make it necessary or desirable for him to become involved. See 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J.; 
Princeton University Press, 1963); Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren 
Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co., 1954); Angus 
Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, The American 
Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960); Ada Finifter, "Dimensions of 
Alienation," American Political Science Review, 64 (June 1970), 389-410; Ed- 
ward Muller, "Cross National Dimensions of Political Competence," American 
Political Science Review, 64 (September 1970), 792-809. 
11 In his discussion of the consequences of the trust-efficacy combination, 
Gamson draws on his previous work in this area and on the dissertation of 
Jeffrey Paige. Although Gamson deals with political efficacy, his use of the 
concept "efficacy" is consistent with the term political competence as employed 
in this research. See Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 40-55; 
and also his Power and Discontent, 42-52. 
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competence but who feel a strong allegiance to the political system, 
constitute a second type which is similar to the subject orientation 
portrayed by Almond and Verba. Bound by an attachment to 
symbols of nation and community, the extent of this group's en- 
gagement in political life is often constrained by an excessive re- 
spect for the law and a restricted sense of personal rights and priv- 
ileges. The third combination, a mixture of political competence 
and confidence in government, meets the civic ideal, supporting 
active political involvement, yet at the same time staying within the 
bounds of social convention. 
And finally, a sense of political competence coupled with low 
trust provides the potential for political action, but of a highly 
volatile sort. A feeling of competence merged with distrust affects 
not only the likelihood of political participation but also the means, 
for should one's beliefs in the possibility for mass political influence 
be juxtaposed with a belief that government is unresponsive to cer- 
tain interests, the very legitimacy of the regime may eventually be 
called into question. Depending in part, then, on the extent of 
political competence and on the intensity of the conviction that the 
system is not responding as it should, one can suggest those re- 
sulting conditions that nurture within-system tensions and encour- 
age system instability. They include withdrawal of support by a 
significant segment of the population; discontinuity in support; 
fragmentation in existing political coalitions; and polarization.12 
Alternatively, when government is viewed as responsive to citizen 
inputs and willing to channel public resources in directions indi- 
cated by those inputs, allegiant orientations that broaden the extent 
of diffuse support are encouraged. 
Empirical research has shown that trust and competence are 
linked to one another, but the character of the association between 
these two variables and their relationship to various forms of po- 
litical behavior need to be further explored.13 
12 Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962), 
448. 
13 Gamson reports data collected by Paige as corroborative evidence for his 
typology. Studying black residents of Newark in the aftermath of the 1967 
disturbances in that city, Paige found that low trusters were no more likely 
than others to have engaged in riot-related behavior. However, when po- 
litical efficacy (measured by a political information item) and trust are ex- 
amined together, the findings are compelling: persons with high efficacy and 
low political trust constitute the group most likely to have engaged in riot 
behavior; persons with a medium level of trust and high efficacy constitute 
64 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS VOL. 37, 1975 
HYPOTHESES 
The literature on trust and competence treats a number of 
theoretically important problems, among them, the relationship be- 
tween interpersonal and political trust;14 the extent of trust and 
competence within select publics;15 the relationship between po- 
litical trust and political competence;16 and the impact of trust and 
competence on behavior and behavioral predispositions.17 This 
the group most likely to have engaged in conventional civil rights activities; 
and those with both a high level of trust and a high sense of efficacy con- 
stitute the group most likely to have limited their political activity to the 
ballot box. "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 40-55. In an ambitious and 
thorough empirical treatment of the trust phenomenon, Aberbach and Walker 
report moderately strong correlation coefficients between trust and three in- 
dices of political expectations, among them, political competence (Gamma= 
.40 for blacks; Gamma = .32 for whites). Trust is also found to constrain 
the respondent's "potential political behavior" in race-related matters, but 
Aberbach and Walker make no effort to link directly the three variables of 
competence, trust, and behavior. "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,205- 
1,207. Cole, conducting a secondary analysis of the 1970 SRC national sample, 
did test for causal linkages in a political trust model incorporating nontradi- 
tional modes of political behavior. Again, a very strong relationship is ob- 
tained between political efficacy and political trust (Gamma = .55), but when 
the combined impact of efficacy, trust, and other variables is considered, the 
"model fails to account for as handsome a percentage of the 'non-conventional' 
tactic sympathy as one would expect." "Causes and Consequences," 19. 
14Robert E. Lane, Political Life (New York: The Free Press, 1959), 163- 
166; Agger, Goldstein and Pearl, "Political Cynicism," 477-506; Almond and 
Verba, Civic Culture, 248-288; Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political 
Ideology," American Sociological Review, 21 (December 1956), 690-695; Aber- 
bach and Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,204-1,205; Litt, 
"Political Cynicism," 315; Cole, "Causes and Consequences," 9-11; Aberbach, 
"Alienation," 92. 
15 Abramson, "Political Efficacy and Political Trust," 1,244; Aberbach and 
Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,203-1,204; Watts, "Efficacy, 
Trust," passim; Miller, Brown and Raine, "Social Conffict," passim; Litt, "Po- 
litical Cynicism," 312-323; McDill and Ridley, "Status, Anomia," 206-210. 
16 Aberbach, "Alienation," 92; Aberbach and Walker, "Political Trust and 
Racial Ideology," 1,205-1,207; Abramson, "Political Efficacy," 1,244; Cole, 
"Causes and Consequences," 11-12; Fraser, "The Mistrustful-Efficacious Hy- 
pothesis," 444-449; Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 46-52; 
Brett W. Hawkins, Vincent L. Marando and George A. Taylor, "Efficacy, Mis- 
trust and Political Participation: Findings From Additional Data and Indi- 
cators," Journal of Politics, 33 (November 1971), 1,130-1,136; Stokes, "Popular 
Evaluations of Government," 67. 
17 Aberbach and Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,213-1,219; 
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literature suggests the following hypotheses, as applied to a univer- 
sity population. 
(1) College students as a group will exhibit a higher level of 
political competence and a lower level of political trust than is 
found in the general public. 
(2) Students who have trust in government will tend to have 
faith in other people. 
(3) Students who are politically competent will manifest pre- 
dispositions to engage in politics. 
(4) Those students who are politically competent will tend also 
to be trusting of government. 
(5) Students who are both politically competent and distrustful 
of government will be more open than others to unconventional 
political actions. 
DATA 
Data for examining the interaction of trust and competence were 
obtained in the spring of 1972 from a sample of 661 university 
students in the Cleveland, Ohio, area. Respondents were selected 
on the basis of a serial systematic method (employing a random 
start) of all full-time students drawn equally from Case Western 
Reserve University, a private high-tuition university, Cleveland 
State University, a public, primarily commuter university, and John 
Carroll University, a private coeducational university affiliated with 
the Jesuit order.18 
Cole, "Causes and Consequences," 16-19; Fraser, "The Mistrustful-Efficacious 
Hypothesis," 444-449; Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 50-52; 
Gamson, Power and Discontent, 42-52; Hawkins et al., "Efficacy, Mistrust," 
1,130-1,136; Kraus et al., "Motivational Correlates," 387-388; Watts, "Efficacy, 
Trust," 294-299. 
18 A 71-item questionnaire was mailed to respondents on April 27, 1972, 
followed five days later with a postcard reminder. Questionnaires numbering 
661 were returned, a 55 percent response rate. Of the Case Western Reserve 
University sample, 65 percent responded, compared with a 50 percent return 
from the two other universities. Three different universities were included in 
this study in order to obtain a less homogeneous sample, and to reduce the 
likelihood of bias derived from student association with a single campus. These 
three universities differ in terms of the social classes from which their students 
are drawn as well as in school milieux. A careful inspection and comparison 
of sample and population characteristics for sex, race, class standing, and cur- 
riculum reveals no significant biases for these variables. 
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The principal variables utilized in this report are: interpersonal 
trust; political trust; two dimensions of political competence; and 
two measures of orientation to political activity. 
Interpersonal Trust. To determine whether students' trust in 
government is a reflection of a broader trust and confidence in 
people, we included in the questionnaire the Survey Research Cen- 
ter's (SRC) adaptation of the Rosenberg Faith-in-People Scale.19 
The scale consists of three items in forced-choice format, with 
scores combined into a simple additive index. 
Political Trust. Trust in government is measured by a commonly 
used SRC item, worded as follows: 
How much of the time do you think we can trust the government in Washing- 
ton to do what is right-just about always, most of the time, some of the 
time, or almost never? 
Because this question has been put to national samples of Ameri- 
cans since 1958, it allows for observation of national trends and for 
comparison of the Cleveland student population with the nation- 
at-large. 20 
Political Competence. Students' beliefs about their ability to in- 
fluence the government are measured by two questions from Al- 
mond and Verba's scale of subjective competence.21 The first item 
19 The questions are: 
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or 
that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 
2. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that 
they are mostly just looking out for themselves? 
3. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if 
they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? 
20 The trust item was scored 1 through 4 with the lowest value assigned 
to respondents answering "just about always" (high trust), and the highest 
value assigned to respondents answering "almost never" (low trust). This 
question measuring trust in government was also part of a three-item index of 
political disaffection along with the following items: 
1. Do you believe that there is a "credibility gap" between what the gov- 
ernment does and what it says-yes, definitely; yes, probably; no? 
2. Do you think that people like you have too little political power, or just 
about the right amount? 
To permit a comparison of political trust with this index, coefficients for this 
index are also presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
21 The following were used as indices of political competence: 
1. Now suppose that a law were being considered by the Congress that you 
considered to be very harmful or unjust. If you made an effort to block 
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(referred to as "governmental responsiveness") poses a hypothetical 
situation in which Congress is considering legislation that the re- 
spondent believes to be "harmful or unjust," and he is asked to 
judge the probability of success in trying to block its passage. This 
item is followed by a second (referred to as "political self-confi- 
dence") asking whether the respondent would himself become in- 
volved, that is, if he as an interested citizen would actively oppose 
this law. Both competence items serve as indicators of people's 
predispositions to engage in political activity. Our use of the two 
items separately is consistent with Converse's recent analysis of the 
SRC's scale of political efficacy. In what had originally been a uni- 
dimensional scale, Converse detects a bifurcation into personal 
capabilities and perception-of-system components.22 
Orientations to Action. To measure students' orientations to 
political action, we determined each respondent's inclination and 
ability to specify a plan or strategy for influencing Congress ("En- 
gagement Index") and the mode of action called for in the strategy 
("Engagement Direction"). These variables are adapted from an 
item also appearing in The Five Nation Study's subjective compe- 
tence scale. Almond and Verba asked their respondents what they 
could do about undesirable legislation, and a similar question was 
put to our sample. We asked, "What methods would you be most 
likely to use in trying to persuade Congress that the law it was 
considering was harmful or unjust?" 
(a) Engagement Index. One way to analyze the responses is to 
dichotomize the sample into those who responded to the question 
and those who did not (the latter group including respondents who 
answered that they would do "nothing"). We hypothesized that 
differences between the two groups would be highly correlated with 
the dimensions of political competence that are outlined above, 
passage of this law, how likely is it that you would succeed: very likely; 
somewhat likely; or not very likely? 
2. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you would actually try to do 
something about it: very likely; somewhat likely; or not very likely? 
22 Philip Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," in The Human 
Meaning of Social Change, ed. Angus Campbell and Philip Converse (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), 325-330. On close inspection of 
national trend data, Converse found that the decline in efficacy varied by 
education: the less educated were likely to show a decline in personal effec- 
tiveness while the better educated seemed to reflect a decline in their evalua- 
tions of system responsiveness. 
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since providing a method of influence may itself be considered as 
one dimension of political competence. In short, people who feel 
that the system is responsive and who feel confident in their own 
abilities to effect change should be more likely than others to pro- 
pose some method of action as opposed to thinking that nothing 
can be done. 
It is clear, however, that most citizens, and especially most uni- 
versity students, have little difficulty in giving some type of answer 
to the question that we posed-often, we would assume, without 
much thought-and we expected to find the distribution of re- 
sponses highly skewed. In order to probe one step further, there- 
fore, we asked, "Let's say that the method or methods of persuasion 
that you use don't prove successful. Then, what would you be 
most likely to do?" Whereas only two percent of the students re- 
sponded "nothing" to the first question and six percent did not re- 
spond at all, 26 percent of all respondents indicated that they 
would "give up" if their first attempt failed while nine percent gave 
no second answer. With the inclusion of this second item, then, we 
increased the size of the group giving partial or incomplete answers 
to 43 percent (classified as "low" on the Engagement Index), a re- 
sult which gave us a much more realistic indication of the propor- 
tion of the sample that is least disposed to engage in political action. 
(b) Engagement Direction. In addition to information about 
the number of alternatives that the respondent can, and is willing 
to, devise in order to influence Congress, the same question elicits 
information about the kinds of strategies that are being proposed. 
Engagement Direction, we hypothesized, would be less highly cor- 
related with political competence than with political trust. Al- 
though the efficacious person possesses the kind of outlook that is 
psychologically most conducive to political activity per se, the par- 
ticular method selected is much more likely to be a function of be- 
liefs about the type of behavior that is necessary to bring about 
desired outcomes.23 The latter partially reflects an over-all evalua- 
tion of the government with which one would have to contend, and 
the concept of political trust clearly taps such an orientation. 
Accordingly, we coded the answers to our open-ended questions 
into "traditional" liberal democratic modes of political influence 
(voting, writing to one's congressmen, organizing with others into 
23 See Gamson, Power and Discontent, for a more elaborate argument re- 
lating political trust to political action, especially pp. 163-183. 
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groups, lobbying, and the like), and "nontraditional" political strate- 
gies (mass activities, demonstrations, picketing, riots, violence, and 
so on). Again, our two-item sequence proved especially useful in 
distinguishing between these two styles of political activity. In 
responding to the first question, for example, only five percent gave 
nontraditional methods. When asked what they would do if their 
initial strategy failed, however, 26 percent of this latter group es- 
calated to a nontraditional activity. Of the students who are most 
disposed to engage in political action, then, the majority fell into 
two categories: those who gave a traditional response to both 
questions (33 percent of the total sample; 58 percent of the stu- 
dents scoring "high" on the Engagement Index); and those who 
started with a traditional strategy and moved to a nontraditional 
one (20 percent of the total sample; 35 percent of students scoring 
"high" on the Engagement Index).24 
FINDINGS 
It is useful to report our findings in the following order: (1) the 
incidence of trust and competence among students; (2) the rela- 
tionship between interpersonal and political trust; (3) the concept 
of political competence; (4) the trust-competence relationship; and 
(5) the relationship between trust, competence, and orientations to 
action. 
(1) Comparison Between Students and the General Public. The 
SRc provides us with a 15 year time frame for viewing trends in 
political trust. As Table 1 makes clear, public confidence in gov- 
ernment has consistently declined during the last decade and a half. 
To be sure, there are always those who are skeptical about poli- 
tics, but apparently the concurrence of the Vietnam conflict, the 
"credibility gap," and the heightened sense of anxiety over the 
direction and pace of social change, has helped to undermine 
people's faith in their national government. Students, who have 
shown themselves to be especially sensitive to many of these issues, 
are even more distrustful of government than the general public. 
This above-average level of political mistrust among students, it 
24 Only three percent of the total sample can be classified as having pro- 
posed alternative methods both of which are unconventional, and one percent 
of our students actually "de-escalated" by moving from a nontraditional to a 
traditional strategy. 
70 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 37, 1975 
should be noted, fulfills the first of Gamson's two conditions for 
nontraditional political behavior. The second condition relates to 
political competence. 
TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF STUDENT SAMPLE AND NATIONAL SAMPLES (SRC) 
Governmental Political Self- 
Political Trust Responsiveness confidence 
Year Meana S.D. N Meanb S.D. N Meanc S.D. N 
1958 (SRC) 2.07 .668 1737 
1964 (SRC) 2.08 .636 1436 
1966 (SRC) 2.18 .771 1239 2.67 .683 1059 2.59 .843 1162 
1968 (SRC) 2.30 .724 1310 2.41 .752 801 
1970 (SRC) 2.39 .743 1461 
1972 (SRC) 2.41 .601 2232 
1972 Cleve- 
land Area 
Students 2.66 .768 648 2.70 .656 647 2.27 .785 654 
Source: The data utilized in this table were made available, in part, by the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The ICPR does not, how- 
ever, bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. 
aScores range from 1 (most trusting) to 4 (least trusting); "it depends" 
and "don't know" responses are excluded from the calculations in all categories. 
b Scores range from 1 ("high" governmental responsiveness) to 3 ("low" 
governmental responsiveness). 
e Scores range from 1 ("high" political self-confidence) to 3 ("low" political 
self-confidence). 
On the measure of governmental responsiveness, no definite pat- 
tern appears, though students are less likely than the general public 
to expect success with Congress. When the "it depends" and "don't 
know" categories are included in the calculations, the proportion of 
students who view the government as unresponsive is markedly 
higher than that of the general public.25 Of the students, 71 per- 
cent believed it unlikely that they could influence Congress, com- 
pared to 58 percent of the public in 1966 and 47 percent in 1968 
who thought so. Comparing the respective populations on the sec- 
25 In calculating the mean scores, "it depends" and "not ascertained" cate- 
gories were excluded. This procedure affects the comparison between the 
national and student samples on the governmental responsiveness variable 
because 18 percent of the national sample can be found in these categories 
while only two percent of the students are so situated. 
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ond dimension of political competence, we find that students are 
more politically self-confident. When asked if they would actually 
try to influence the Congress, college students responded in the 
affirmative more often than others. This higher level of political 
self-confidence, then, satisfies the second requirement of the Gam- 
son equation. The implication of these findings will be examined 
below. 
(2) Interpersonal Trust and Political Trust. It seems reasonable 
enough to expect trust in government to be a manifestation of a 
more generalized sense of trust in one's fellow man, the arguments 
being: a) that political trust represents less of a judgment based 
on performance criteria than it does a basic evaluative predisposi- 
tion or response set, and b) that government consists of people 
who hold office, and "if one cannot trust other people generally, 
one can certainly not trust those under the temptations of and with 
the powers which come with public office."26 Although one can 
find some support for this hypothesis,27 a number of studies, in- 
cluding our own, report a conspicuously weak relationship (Gamma 
= .15) between interpersonal and political trust.28 
Confidence in government bears little relationship to faith in 
people, we might suggest, when "government" cannot be substi- 
tuted for a specific reference group-one that a respondent might 
envisage when given the cue "people" in questions asking whether 
"most people can be trusted." In part, at least, interpersonal trust 
would seem to reflect the kinds of experiences and learning that 
take place among immediate cohorts, and these may be different 
enough from one's own experiences with the "government in Wash- 
ington" to modify the impact of what Hess and Torney call "inter- 
26 Lane, Political Life, 164. 
27 In their codification of SRC measures, Robinson et al., report Pearson 
product moment correlations of .24 between "trust in people" and "trust in 
government" for the 1964 study, Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor: 
SRC, Institute for Social Research, 1969). Using 1970 SRc data, a Gamma of 
.28 was obtained between "personal satisfaction" and political trust measures 
by Cole, "Causes and Consequences," 10. See also Almond and Verba, The 
Civic Culture, 248-288; Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," 690- 
695; and Agger, Goldstein, and Pearl, "Political Cynicism," 477-506. 
28 Aberbach and Walker report a Gamma of .17 for blacks and .16 for whites, 
"Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,206. See also Litt, "Political Cyni- 
cism," 315. 
72 TIE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 37, 1975 
personal transfer" as it occurs during early socialization.29 Fur- 
thermore, there is evidence to indicate that aggregate levels of 
public trust in government have diminished over the past several 
years, especially among blacks and students, while no such evi- 
dence exists about people's trust in mankind. Since this could 
affect the magnitude of the relationship between the two kinds of 
trust for these groups, the general hypothesis that faith in people 
constrains confidence in government may need to be qualified ac- 
cordingly.30 
(3) Dimensions of Competence. There is a moderately strong 
association (Gamma= .35) between governmental responsiveness 
and political self-confidence. (See Table 2.) As we might expect, 
those who believe that successful influence of Congress is possible 
tend to express a companion belief in their own willingness to at- 
tempt such influence. That the two competence dimensions are 
not more highly associated, however, indicates a degree of inde- 
pendence between these items. Not all students who claim that 
they would try to alter legislative outcomes expect to be successful 
in their undertaking; likewise, some students who assert high ex- 
pectations of success with Congress would abstain from any such 
effort. We can distinguish, therefore, three types of "political 
29 A brief description of the interpersonal transfer model of learning is pro- 
vided by Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney in their study of American 
school children, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1968), 24. And since Edward 
Banfield, earlier, and Dean Jaros and his colleagues have described subcultures 
in two nations, there is some evidence to suggest the utility of the model for 
understanding the personal trust-political trust phenomenon. See Banfield, 
The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958); 
and Jaros et al., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an Ameri- 
can Subculture," American Political Science Review, 62 (June 1968), 564-575. 
As appealing as is this thesis for understanding the relationships between one 
set of objects and political attitudes, the transference of learning from one 
area to another depends, in large part, upon the substitutability of one set of 
objects for another. On this point, see Theodore Newcomb, Ralph Turner, 
and Philip Converse, Social Psychology: The Study of Human Interaction 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), 121-149. 
30 We find that the correlation coefficient between trust in government and 
self-reported conservatism-liberalism stance is Gamma= .50, with those who 
call themselves liberals less trusting than conservatives. This result suggests 
that for certain groups, such as university students, political ideological vari- 
ables may be much more relevant to political trust than explanations based on 
interpersonal trust. 
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competents." First is the person who is competent on both of the 
above dimensions (23 percent of the sample). A second type con- 
sists of people who believe that the system will respond to their 
attempts at persuasion but who are not very likely to make an 
effort (four percent). And finally, there is the person who is po- 
litically self-confident but who thinks that system responsiveness 
is unlikely (48 percent). The fact that more students fall into the 
third category than into either the first or the second indicates that 
among those who are disposed to participate, many are motivated 
by something other than their estimate of success with Congress. 
TABLE 2 
ASSOCIATION (GAMMA) BETWEEN POLITICAL TRUST, GOVERNMENTAL 
RESPONSIVENESS, AND POLITICAL SELF-CONFIDENCE 
Governmental Political Self- 
Responsiveness confidence 
Governmental Responsiveness .35 
Political Trust .24 -.22 
Index of Political Disaffectiona .25 -.21 
a See footnote 20. 
(4) Trust and Competence. On the basis of previous studies, we 
had expected to find a clear and consistent positive relationship be- 
tween political competence measures and political trust.31 To the 
contrary, results are mixed. (See Table 2.) We find neither an 
exceptionally strong association between political trust and dimen- 
sions of competence nor a relationship that is consistently positive. 
As was anticipated, those who trust the national government are 
more likely than others to believe that successful congressional in- 
fluence is possible, yet the Gamma between trust and governmental 
responsiveness is a moderate .24. At the same time, politically trust- 
ing students exhibit less of an inclination to take an active part in 
such efforts (Gamma=-.22). Those who distrust the government, 
then, are somewhat more likely than their counterparts to say that 
they would attempt to influence the legislature. 
The most interesting finding here is the negative relationship be- 
tween trust and political self-confidence. Among other things, it 
raises the possibility of reciprocal influence such that a strong 
31 Aberbach and Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,207; Cole, 
"Causes and Consequences," 11; Watts, "Efficacy, Trust," 295. See, however, 
Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 50. 
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sense of competence results in political action, and political action 
results in a lowering of political trust. Though we are unable to 
explore the question of the attitudinal after-effects of political par- 
ticipation, we have some data that indirectly support such an in- 
terpretation. We asked the students whether they had ever 
worked for a political party or candidate, and the association 
(Gamma) between this measure of activity and political trust is 
-.21. Those who had participated in partisan activities were more 
likely to be low in trust than nonparticipants. While causal direc- 
tion is uncertain, the possibility exists that political distrust is a 
consequence of one's participation in politics, a notion quite inimi- 
cal to the belief that citizen activity promotes positive orientations 
to the system. It is also possible, however, for political distrust to 
have stimulated political activity, and in this regard the thesis ad- 
vanced by William Gamson is most relevant. We address this 
topic below. 
(5) Strategies for Political Action. For those who are interested 
in the relationship between political trust and political competence, 
few issues command greater attention than the ties between atti- 
tudes about the political system and orientations to action. We 
have conceptualized action orientations in two ways: in terms of 
one's willingness and ability to articulate political strategies (the 
Engagement Index); and in terms of the kinds of tactics that the 
individual would find acceptable (Engagement Direction). The 
latter, it will be recalled, incorporates a two-phased strategy rang- 
ing from traditional methods of influence to nontraditional political 
TABLE 3 
ASSOCIATION (GAMMA) BETWEEN POLITICAL COMPETENCE, POLITICAL TRUST, 
AND ORIENTATION TOWARD POLITICAL ACTION 
Political Index of 
Orientation to Governmental Self- Political Political 
Action Responsiveness confidence Trust Disaffection 
Engagement Index .51 .35 .10 .03 
Engagement Direction .05 -.13 .50 .38 
action. We have discussed the lack of a strong relationship be- 
tween political trust and political competence. The relationship 
between political trust and the Engagement Index is also weak 
(Gamma=.10), evidence that trust is not a good predictor of a 
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person's readiness to state a plan for political action. (See Table 
3.) Political competence, on the other hand, is more powerful in 
its association with the Engagement Index. People who believe 
that successful influence is possible as well as those who express 
a willingness to attempt such action are more likely than others to 
propose political strategies. The respective Gamma values are .51 
and .36. Clearly, sense of political competence helps to explain 
some of the variation in people's predispositions to engage in po- 
litical action. 
In terms of the direction of engagement, political trust is a much 
more potent variable in understanding the kinds of strategies a 
person would employ. Whereas weak relationships are obtained 
between Engagement Direction and governmental responsiveness 
(Gamma=.05) and between Engagement Direction and political 
self-confidence (Gamma=-.13), the association between political 
trust and Engagement Direction is impressive (Gamma = .50). 
While the politically trusting students tend to favor "traditional" 
methods of influence, the distrusting are substantially more apt to 
select mass demonstrations and protest tactics. This finding is most 
interesting in view of the negative relationships between political 
trust and political self-confidence, and between political self-con- 
fidence and Engagement Direction. Students who express some 
confidence in themselves as political actors, then, tend more than 
others to distrust the government and to select strategies that in- 
corporate nontraditional tactics. These findings, however, are 
based on bivariate relationships between the respective variables, 
and it remains to be seen how the mixture of political trust and 
political competence affects the direction of political engagement. 
Are the less trusting but politically self-confident students in our 
sample more likely than their cohorts to designate protest and 
sometimes violent methods of political persuasion, as Gamson pre- 
dicts? The data in Table 4 shows that they are. The frequency 
of nontraditional strategies is greatest among those who are most 
self-confident and also most distrustful. Of additional importance 
is the finding that students who are least politically self-confident 
and who are inclined to trust the government tend to limit their 
options to a range of traditional political activities like writing 
letters, lobbying their representatives, and seeking legal remedies. 
Finally, when political trust is held constant, the higher the sense 
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traditional strategies. Among students, then, the predisposition to 
participate is correlated with the predisposition to use methods 
intended to challenge system norms. In sum, trust and competence 
in combination provide us with a useful indicator of student orienta- 
tions to political action. 
DISCUSSION 
Two findings in this study warrant further discussion. The first 
is the relationship between political competence and political trust, 
and the second is the relationship between these variables and 
orientations to political action. 
Research devoted to the relationship between trust and compe- 
tence has provided a mixed pattern of findings, but of late a num- 
ber of investigators have reported a strong, positive relationship 
between the two variables.32 In this study of Cleveland-area uni- 
versity students, another pattern emerges: we obtain neither a 
strong nor a consistently positive relationship between political 
trust and two dimensions of political competence. Trust is posi- 
32 A few words are in order about the inconsistencies in the trust-com- 
petence literature. Research in this area is quite varied, differing in a number 
of important respects. For instance, some investigators have utilized the con- 
cept "political competence" while others have used "political efficacy"; different 
indicators have been used to measure essentially the same phenomenon; and 
trust and competence have been examined in a variety of contexts. To cite 
just a few examples, Aberbach and Walker use a six-item index of political 
competence, which includes national and local competence items, to study res- 
idents of Detroit in "Political Trust and Racial Ideologies"; Watts modifies the 
SRc efficacy items in order to derive an efficacy/powerlessness scale in "Effi- 
cacy, Trust," 293; Cole initially uses a single item extracted from the SRC'S 
political efficacy scale to study the national electorate in "Causes and Conse- 
quences," 11, and subsequently employs the more complete version of the SRC 
scale in "Toward a Model of Political Trust," 815; and Paige uses a political 
information item as a measure of political efficacy to study black residents of 
Newark, in Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 50. These differ- 
ences may help to account for the variation in findings: Aberbach and Walker 
report a substantial positive relationship between trust and competence; both 
Cole and Watts find that efficacy is even more highly correlated with trust; 
and Paige observes a slightly negative association between trust and efficacy. 
Our own data suggest that there may be significant differences in the trust- 
competence relationship depending upon the particular subdimension of com- 
petence that is used. Furthermore, our findings based on a student population 
are more akin to Paige's data on the black population of Newark than to Cole's 
study of the population-at-large. 
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tively related to governmental responsiveness and negatively as- 
sociated with political self-confidence. 
In examining the implications of trust and competence for po- 
litical action, we assumed that the articulation of political strate- 
gies was a valid indicator of one's propensity to participate in 
politics. This assumption is understandable since strategy articu- 
lation implies both a political readiness and some information about 
the channels available for political influence. There are two essen- 
tial decisions that an individual must make: the first is whether or 
not to participate; and the second is what direction that participa- 
tion will take. With respect to the former, the two competence 
items proved to be valuable indicators of one's disposition to plan 
a strategy. Political trust, on the other hand, provided an indication 
of the kinds of political strategies that students were apt to em- 
ploy: those who trusted the government tended to prefer the more 
traditional forms of political action. When trust and competence 
are simultaneously examined for their impact on action orientations, 
we obtain an even more powerful measure of the direction of these 
activities. 
Our two most important findings, then, are the negative relation- 
ship between trust and political self-confidence, and the association 
between distrust and the proposed use of nontraditional political 
tactics. Further investigation reveals that politically self-confident 
students exhibit a higher-than-average interest in politics, yet they 
tend to be low in political trust and are more likely than others to 
resort to unconventional political strategies. These data, however, 
deal basically with behavioral predispositions. What may be even 
more significant, then, is the finding that those who have actually 
engaged in partisan political activities are somewhat less trusting 
of government than those who have not participated, a fact that 
leads us to ask whether for some people participation has a damp- 
ening effect on levels of trust. Reciprocal influences may be at 
work: high levels of trust are conducive to political activity, but 
participatory experiences, in turn, feed back to reduce levels of 
trust. If in fact this reduction occurs, it would be appropriate to 
consider negative feedback as one of the elements in the generation 
of political distrust. 
In his discussion of the way in which distrust is diffused through 
the political system, Gamson claims that it originates in the citizen's 
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negative perception of a set of official decisions. These decisions, 
then, cumulate so that initial suspicions come to taint the individu- 
al's view of institutions, the regime, and ultimately the political com- 
munity.33 Our data, however, are not inconsistent with the hypoth- 
esis that political distrust is a function of actual participation, as 
well as of evaluations of system outputs. 
The extent of these negative feedback influences is of special 
importance to the United States because an increasing proportion 
of the citizenry is becoming better educated, and higher levels of 
education are generally associated with feelings of political com- 
petence.34 Should participation result in a decline in trust for 
some segments of the population, it is quite possible that the volatile 
conditions described by Gamson will become more prevalent as ever 
larger numbers of politically competent people begin to distrust the 
government. If participation in political life were to affect ad- 
versely both the individual's political trust and his sense of political 
competence, however, then the likelihood of nonconventional ac- 
tivities might not appear so great. Among our respondents, for 
example, levels of political competence as measured by govern- 
mental responsiveness are especially low. While low levels of trust 
and competence discourage the use of nontraditional forms of 
political activity, these conditions are equally inappropriate to other 
forms of citizen participation. People who lack trust and compe- 
tence tend to withdraw from, or engage perfunctorily in, political 
life.35 
As seen in our data, the climate of the university in the early 70s 
is one permeated with a distrust of government and a sense of 
pessimism about governmental responsiveness. Yet a significant 
number of students still exhibit confidence in their personal political 
abilities. Ultimately, the importance of these attitudinal patterns 
depends upon their durability over time, the continuation of con- 
ditions that gave rise to them, and the kinds of opportunities that 
will emerge in the future to stimulate the public's participation in 
politics. 
33 Gamson, Power and Discontent, 51-52; see, also, Miller, Brown, and Raine, 
"Social Conflict," 61-65. 
34 Cf. Dean Jaros, "Political Response to New Skills: The Conforming and 
the Deviant," in Political Attitudes, ed. Nimmo and Bonjean, 228-236. 
35 Cf. Watts, "Efficacy, Trust," 300. 
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COMMENTS 
Findings such as those discussed above are intriguing in their 
ramifications and suggest a number of important questions. How 
durable are attitudes of trust and distrust? What level of trust is a 
necessary or sufficient condition for the continued stability of dem- 
ocratic government? What are the conditions and circumstances 
that facilitate the diffusion or generalization of distrust? And what 
are the correlative factors that move people to accept one kind of 
political strategy over another? 
The long-term impact of student distrust in government remains 
to be seen. Although a rather high proportion of students lack 
faith in the national government, their distrust may not be as dele- 
terious to the system as some have prophesied. Portions of the stu- 
dent community harbor a generalized rebelliousness toward au- 
thority figures which sometimes includes political authorities. Such 
hostility, however, need not have dire consequences for the political 
system if it is neither central to the person's belief system nor ex- 
treme in its intensity. For some, expressions of distrust simply lack 
substance, while for others political distrust is without an emotional 
anchor. The durability of these opinions as well as their conse- 
quences for political behavior remain open questions. 
Furthermore, when distrust is highly focused and personalized, 
the prospect that generalization will occur from one attitude object 
to another is diminished. The belief that "Jones is a corrupt poli- 
tician" need not lead one to conclude that all politicians are cor- 
rupt or that political institutions are no longer reliable. What is 
the threshold that must be reached if institutions are to be tainted 
by individual culpability? Generalizing from distrust of authorities 
to distrust of institutions is equivalent to the identification of indi- 
vidual error with institutional failure. The constraints militating 
against such a diffusion of distrust are indeed considerable, com- 
pounded by the fact that the burden of guilt for organizational 
shortcomings and errors is often displaced onto the individual.36 
Partial evidence in support of this distinction between distrust as 
a transient opinion and distrust as a more durable and generalized 
behavioral cue exists in the number of students who lack confidence 
36 Robert Presthus, "Toward a Theory of Organizational Behavior," in Read- 
ings in Public Administration, ed. Maurice E. O'Donnell (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1966), 47. 
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in government yet remain content to opt for the more traditional 
forms of politics. Thus the current low level of political trust among 
university students may be a short-term occurrence resulting from 
the Vietnam War, domestic unrest, urban blight, and so forth. With 
the passage of time and the eventual lessening of those conditions 
producing the ebb tide in trust, confidence in government may re- 
emerge to its previous, more robust levels. If so, the finding of a 
high incidence of distrust within the student community assumes a 
lower order of importance. It is seen as a temporary manifestation 
of transitory and idiosyncratic occurrences in the political life of 
the nation. 
To the contrary, however, a number of factors and conditions 
suggest a greater durability to, and importance of, today's standard 
of political trust. We have said that the salience of our findings 
depends upon the measure to which trust-eroding conditions con- 
tinue, the degree to which extant attitudes of distrust are rein- 
forced, and the extent to which opportunities for political engage- 
ment are ripe. These conditions, taken individually, need not have 
pernicious effects for the society. Their occurrence within a brief 
span of time, however, makes problematical the assumed resilience 
of political trust. 
Since these data were collected in 1972, the most relevant politi- 
cal event has been the fuller disclosure of the details of the Water- 
gate affair. Few events in our political history have reached the 
enormity of Watergate, with its evidence of political spying, sur- 
reptitious entry, politicization of governmental agencies, and cam- 
paign sabotage. One thing seems certain. The illegal activities of 
the Nixon administration will do much to reinforce the feelings 
and beliefs of those who are already distrustful of government. 
And for those in the electorate who have been most allegiant in 
their political orientations, Watergate is likely to be increasingly 
viewed as something more than the ill wind of administrative in- 
discretion. Whether the threshold point for the diffusion of dis- 
trust will have been reached in the aftermath of Watergate remains 
a moot issue one dependent, as we have suggested, on the degree 
to which blame for these events falls on a number of individuals 
rather than on the institutions themselves. 
Aside from these reinforcing conditions, a second factor presages 
a continuation of low levels of public confidence in government: 
developments in the media industry. Combined with an unprece- 
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dented availability of information from the news media is the in- 
terest in investigative reporting. Developments in media tech- 
nology have resulted in the widespread and almost immediate 
diffusion of information to mass audiences while increased profes- 
sionalization in the journalism fraternity has encouraged a more 
critical scrutiny of public events and official acts. 
As larger numbers of politically self-confident, yet distrusting 
students involve themselves in social and political affairs, the ques- 
tion of political stability becomes paramount. System stability will 
turn on the capacity of government to respond quickly to salient 
political issues and problems. The changing composition and 
character of the electorate seem to demand a tempo of response 
that is without precedent in American political history. 
